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1. Overview  
The system of local governance in South Sudan (independent since 2011) comprises of both 
formal state structures and traditional authorities. The three tier local government structure faces 
significant capacity and resource constraints – manifested in weak effectiveness - which are 
being exacerbated by the government’s decision to increase the number of states in South 
Sudan from 10 to 32. Chiefs and similar traditional authorities were involved in local 
administration from colonial times, predominantly in tax collection and conflict resolution. But 
traditional authorities have been considerably undermined by the previous civil war (1983-2005), 
and there is lack of precise definition about the role of chiefs in the local government system. The 
literature does not talk about the impact of the current civil war (since 2013, ongoing) on local 
governance. Overall, South Sudan presents a mixed and very diverse picture of local 
governance – one which is failing to meet people’s needs.   
Key findings are as follows:  
 Diversity of local governance: ‘The quality of local governance in South Sudan is highly 
heterogeneous as a result of diverse historical, cultural and ethnic characteristics, 
additionally complicated by decades of conflict and social dislocation. Moreover, the 
nature of ethnic and clan based social organisation and the role of traditional authorities 
varies widely across South Sudan’s regions’ (World Bank, 2013: 2-3).  
 Formal local government structure: the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement and 
the Interim Constitution of South Sudan (ICSS) laid out a ‘democratic decentralised 
system of government’. This was detailed in the 2009 Local Government Act (LGA), and 
retained after independence in the 2011 Transitional Constitution. The system comprises 
national, state and local governments – the latter subdivided into counties, payams and 
bomas. Provisions for public participation in local governance include election of county 
commissioners and of county legislative councils, and formation of citizens’ development 
committees. 
 Challenges facing local governments: Since 2011 the government has been engaged 
in a process of ‘recentralisation’ to create a strong executive model of government. This 
has seen many powers moved from states to the centre. In addition, states exercise 
considerable control over local governments, notably through appointment of state 
governors and control of resources. Public participation and accountability provisions in 
the LGA have generally not been realised in practice. Local governments also face 
significant capacity and resource constraints. Public perceptions of local governance 
effectiveness are weak.   
 Creation of new states: In December 2015 the government announced it was increasing 
the number of states from 10 to 28, with a further 4 added in January 2017. The move 
was seen as aimed at securing a balance of power in favour of the President’s Dinka 
tribe and his supporters, strengthening patronage networks and undermining the 
opposition. There are fears it will lead to increased localised conflicts, and exacerbate the 
capacity and resource challenges already facing local governments.  
 Role of traditional authorities: Chiefly institutions vary in structure and selection 
procedure in different areas of South Sudan. During colonial rule, the British adopted a 
system of native administration which entailed decentralisation and use of traditional 
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chiefs, notably for tax collection and conflict resolution. Traditional authorities continued 
to play that role after independence, including during the north-south civil war. They act 
as intermediaries between communities and local governments. They are included in the 
system laid out in the 2009 LGA, though their role is not precisely defined. There are 
contradictions between modern values and traditional governance.  
 Factors undermining chiefly authority: A number of factors, mostly related to the civil 
war, have undermined traditional authorities in South Sudan. Displacement led to new 
chiefs emerging; government and armed forces also appointed new chiefs in areas under 
their control. Where traditional chiefs were retained, they were forced to do the bidding of 
armed groups/the government, and faced severe punishments if they failed to do so. The 
appointment of new chiefs, the proliferation of appointments and the ‘humiliation’ of 
traditional chiefs by armed forces combined to weaken chiefly authority. 
 Effectiveness and legitimacy: state structures vs. traditional authorities: While state 
local government structures enjoy legitimacy in law – provisions for these are laid down in 
the constitution and relevant legislation – their effectiveness is limited, and it is unclear 
how much public legitimacy they enjoy. This is particularly given the lack of public 
participation in local governments. By contrast traditional authorities have in the past 
enjoyed both public legitimacy and been seen as effective, particularly in conflict 
resolution. But their legitimacy has been undermined by the effects of the north-south civil 
war.    
The review found no literature looking at local governance in South Sudan specifically from the 
gender perspective or from that of people with disabilities.   
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2. Evolution of local governance in South Sudan area 
Native administration  
Prior to independence in 1956, Sudan was under Anglo-Egyptian rule since 1899. Initially the 
British tried to take over and co-opt traditional authorities and customary law, but this proved 
ineffective (Hoehne, 2008: 14). In the 1930s, under the ‘Southern Policy’, they introduced a 
system of Native Administration with administrative chieftaincies (Hoehne, 2008: 14; Santschi, 
2014: 44). This entailed indirect rule and devolution. ‘[I]ts basic principle was that the local 
administration of colonial peoples should be conducted through indigenous structures of 
authority, employing indigenous law or custom, as far as this was consistent with British ideas of 
good government and justice’ (Johnson, 2003, cited in Hoehne, 2008: 14). The explicit aims of 
indirect rule were to keep costs low and administration simple, and to ‘develop’ native institutions 
by eradicating the ‘negative’ aspects of it and fostering the ‘positive’ ones (Johnson, 1986, cited 
in Hoehne, 2008: 14). Within native administration, ‘the government’s chief interest was the 
creation of native courts whose main function was to administer customary law and organise 
work parties and the collection of taxes’ (Schomerus & Aalen, 2016: 10).  
Santschi (2014) stresses that chiefs were involved in local conflict resolution long before the 
colonial era. However, because of the strong colonial roots of administrative chieftaincies, they 
have always been closely linked with local government institutions. Their role in modern day 
South Sudan is discussed in Section 4. 
Second Sudanese North-South Civil War (1983-2005)  
During this period two parallel sets of governance structures existed in the area of Southern 
Sudan which later became the independent country of South Sudan (World Bank, 2015b: 21):  
a) Coordinating Council of Southern States (CCSS) – established in 1997 as a result of the 
peace agreement between a rebel faction and the government of Sudan. The agreement 
set out a federal structure for Sudan made up of states (a total of 25 states, 10 in the 
south) and local councils. The CCSS was primarily used by Khartoum to transfer 
resources to the territory it controlled in the south, and was not an effective service 
provider; 
b) Civilian Authority of New Sudan (CANS) – established in 1994 by the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement (SPLM) to manage the areas it controlled. These were divided into 
three regions and 78 local councils (now called counties). CANS relied heavily on donor-
funded NGOs and acted as a coordinator of aid rather than directly providing services 
itself. Centralised control under CANS was limited, creating space for Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA) commanders to ‘carve out fiefdoms’. Chieftaincies played a key 
role, with chiefs engaged in hearing court cases, organising public projects and diffusing 
intercommunity tension.  
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005-2011)  
Greater autonomy for the south was a key element of the negotiated settlement that ended the 
Second Sudanese Civil War in 2005 (World Bank, 2015b). The Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) set up the Republic of Sudan in the north, and Southern Sudan, which 
together ‘made up an asymmetric federal system, similar to Canada and Quebec or Tanzania 
and Zanzibar’ (World Bank, 2015b: 22). The Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan (ICSS), 
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adopted in 2005, outlined a presidential system of government, with an executive, a legislative 
and a judiciary. This system was defined as a ‘democratic decentralised system of government’ 
giving ‘power to the people through the appropriate levels of government where they can best 
manage and direct their affairs’ (World Bank, 2015b: 22). The 10 states under the CCSS were 
retained, along with the county structure created under the CANS: the 10 states comprised 86 
counties.1 Three tiers of local government were specified: county, payam and boma (World Bank, 
2015b: 22).  
During the early CPA period, responsibility for state functions was delegated between levels of 
government in an ad hoc manner. This led to passage of the Local Government Act (LGA) in 
2009, aimed at providing clearer and more detailed rules. The LGA lays out legal provisions 
governing the status of local governments and traditional authorities vis-à-vis subnational 
institutions. Still the main legislation with regard to decentralisation, the LGA’s provisions are 
described below.  
3. Current formal local governance structures  
Post-2011  
Transitional Constitution 2011 
Southern Sudan became South Sudan and gained independence in July 2011. A Transitional 
Constitution was immediately adopted by the South Sudan Legislative Council. The Transitional 
Constitution closely follows the system of government laid out in the Interim Constitution, 
outlining the principle of ‘decentralised democracy’ and defining three layers of government – 
national, state and local (USAID, nd: 39). The central government is responsible for delivery of 
national functions (defence, tertiary education), the states for delivery of secondary services, as 
well as supporting and supervising counties; while basic services have been assigned to local 
governments (World Bank, 2015b: 25). Despite the apparent retention of a decentralised form of 
government, critics argue that the Transitional Constitution actually represents a rollback of this 
process, and a more centralised government (see below). 
Local governance structures in urban and rural areas 
The LGA stipulates three tiers of local government: county, payam and boma in rural areas, and 
city/town, block and quarter in urban areas (USAID, nd: 39). Payams are described in the LGA 
as ‘the coordinating unit of a County which exercises delegated powers from the County’, and 
bomas as the basic administrative unit ‘which shall exercise de-concentrated powers within a 
county’ (USAID, nd: 41; World Bank, 2015b: 44). The LGA specifies that each county is to be 
headed by a commissioner, and each city/town by a mayor; and counties and cities are to have 
legislative councils with up to 35 members directly elected through universal suffrage from 
bomas/quarters (World Bank, 2015b: 44; USAID, nd). Commissioners lead an executive council 
made up of chief administrators and heads of department.  
A World Bank analysis (2015b: 24) identifies a number of shortcomings in the LGA: it doesn’t fill 
all the regulatory gaps regarding the intergovernmental system; it doesn’t specify a role for 
                                                   
1 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counties_of_South_Sudan  
6 
states; and it doesn’t fully define the specific service delivery functions assigned to local 
governments or how sub-county institutions can be formed.  
Apart from terminology, on paper there are no significant differences between the local 
government structure in urban areas and that in rural areas. In practice, however, the former tend 
to deliver a larger range of services and have higher levels of revenue at their disposal (World 
Bank, 2015b: 43). A further distinction is that many cities were previously administered by the 
CCSS, while rural areas were typically controlled by the CANS administration (World Bank, 
2015b: 44).  
Local Government Board 
The local government system is overseen by the Local Government Board. Its mandate is to 
transform local governments (counties, payams, bomas) into a modern, integrated, citizen-
centred intergovernmental system (World Bank, 2015b: 53). Functions of the Local Government 
Board are to: develop relevant concepts of local government systems that promote self-rule at 
the local level; design capacity development programmes for local government authorities; 
coordinate local authorities’ administration and service delivery; and prepare local government 
bills (Hunger Project: nd). However, a 2010 assessment found that the LGB did not have a 
functioning monitoring and evaluation system, and also had very little resources to carry out its 
mission (World Bank, 2015b: 53). 
Effectiveness and legitimacy  
2011 rollback of decentralisation 
As noted above, the Transitional Constitution has been criticised for effectively rolling back the 
decentralisation process to foster centralised government. Cope (2014) argues that in the 2005 
CPA and the Interim Constitution, the South Sudan political elite had no choice but to accept 
devolved government – notably devolution to states and local governments – because this 
strengthened its claim for greater autonomy for Southern Sudan from Khartoum. ‘Effectively, that 
meant that the South had to give its states and localities the same rights it was demanding from 
the government of Sudan’ (Cope, 2014).  
However, once independence was achieved in 2011, that imperative no longer applied and the 
government returned to – what he claims was its preference all along – a centralised, strong 
executive model of government (Cope, 2014). This was manifested in measures such as: erosion 
of legislative and judicial checks on the executive; giving the president the power to dissolve the 
national legislature through a ‘state of emergency’ provision which can be invoked upon finding 
an economic threat to any part of the country; movement of powers from states to the national 
government; giving the president the power to dissolve state councils and dismiss state 
governors; and elimination of state-level courts (Cope, 2014). 
Weak public participation and accountability 
There are provisions in the LGA for public participation. Commissioners and legislative councils 
are supposed to be directly elected – a process that promotes state legitimacy. ‘(L)egislatures 
have an important role to play in ensuring that citizens from across localities feel represented at 
relevant higher levels of government – from payam to county councils and state legislatures, and 
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to the two houses of the national parliament. This can play a very important role in ensuring that 
citizens of different ethnic groups feel that they have a stake in the overall governance of the 
country, and to give the state legitimacy’ (World Bank, 2015b: 48). 
However, as of the end of 2014 the Commissioners had been appointed by state governors 
rather than elected (World Bank, 2015b). Consultations about appointments were held in some 
states to ensure adequate representation and balance ethnic consideration, as well as to enable 
communities to more easily accept a commissioner they might otherwise have opposed (World 
Bank, 2015b: 44). Nonetheless, the fact that they are directly appointed means ‘they are close 
allies and “political agents” for state governors’; moreover, ‘with the governor’s backing, they are 
quite powerful and therefore influence the behaviour of the county executive director and staff’ 
(World Bank; 2015b: 44). As of end 2014 not all counties had legislative councils; but in those 
that did, again, members were appointed by state governors rather than elected (World Bank, 
2015b: 44). The lack of legislative councils undermines citizens’ ability to hold county authorities 
accountable (World Bank, 2013).  
Citizens at boma and payam levels are also entitled, under the LGA, to organise themselves into 
development committees to conduct self-help projects. The Local Government Board had asked 
payams since 2009 to form payam development committees (PDCs), so as to give local people a 
role in county budgeting and planning processes. However, concerns that there were no 
mechanisms to support the formation and training of these committees prompted state and 
county governments to scale back the initiative (World Bank, 2015b: 45). Where development 
committees have been formed, this has been through donor-funded projects. One example is 
Oxfam’s With and Without the State (WWS) Project, which is helping set up PDCs, and working 
alongside local communities and government officials to raise awareness of PDCs and define 
their scope and responsibilities (Morrissey, 2015). 
Given the very limited role given to communities in local government entities, the World Bank 
report concludes: ‘The institutions for horizontal power distribution and for “bottom-up” 
accountability – including representation of citizens at different levels of government, and from 
lower to higher levels of government through legislatures – have thus far remained incomplete’ 
(2015b: 47).  
State control of local governments 
States exercise extensive control over local governments. As noted, county commissioners are 
appointed by state governors and, where county legislative councils are in place, these too were 
appointed by state governors. Senior county administrative officials are assigned to counties by 
State Ministries of Local Government and State Ministries of Finance (World Bank, 2013: 4). 
Fiscal decentralisation is undermined in a number of ways (World Bank, 2013: 4): 
 Fiscal resources and budgetary discretion are concentrated at the state level; in many 
cases even the County Development Grants (CDGs) allocated in the national budget are 
managed by states on behalf of county authorities; 
 While the LGA gives revenue raising powers to local governments, there are no 
supporting regulations on local government and revenue instruments, and at county level 
there is weak capacity for revenue mobilisation and administration; 
 Parallel financing instruments exist, weakening the planning and coordination of local 
public expenditure by counties. These include the Constituency Development Fund that 
is controlled by members of parliament, and external assistance from donors and NGOs. 
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The conclusion is stark: ‘to a significant degree, county governments function as deconcentrated 
bodies under state authority’ (World Bank, 2013: 4).   
Lack of capacity and resources 
Implementation of decentralised government in South Sudan faces a number of challenges 
(Hunger Project, nd): 
 Lack of administrative capacity at the national, state and local levels; 
 Lack of trained personnel to manage the public sector and to work in local capacity 
development.  
 Lack of equitable sharing of natural resource (oil) revenues among entities for essential 
services and for strengthening decentralised local government;  
 Very few institutions of local government outside the capital, Juba and a few of the oil 
producing areas;  
Lack of capacity is an issue that comes up repeatedly in the literature. ‘County capacity is highly 
variable and generally weak’ (World Bank, 2013: 4).  
Effectiveness 
The limited effectiveness of local governments in South Sudan emerges clearly from the findings 
of the Local Governance Barometer (LGB). The LGB is a tool for measuring the status of 
governance by looking at key criteria: effectiveness and efficiency, transparency and rule of law, 
accountability, participation and equity. Locally relevant and easy to understand indicators are 
developed for each of these through a participatory process. The LGB collects and analyses 
perception data from citizens, institutions and local authorities. Scores are given out of 100 for 
each governance criterion: a score of 100 signifies perfect governance, while 0 indicates a 
complete lack of good governance (DANIDA SIDA, 2013: 6).  
The LGB was implemented in two separate localities in South Sudan in August 2013: Rubkona 
County in Unity State, and Rumbek Central County in Lakes State. Although the assessments 
conducted in Rubkona County and Rumbek Central County involved different questions and 
participants, and hence should be interpreted separately, their overall consolidated scores were 
the same at 38/100, which represents a fairly poor level of governance (DANIDA SIDA, 2013: 6). 
In Rubkona County the score obtained for effectiveness was 35/100: ‘there is a lack of sound 
financial management in the county and there is the perception that local government lacks the 
means and training to effectively manage finances’ (DANIDA SIDA, 2013: 7). Citizens mentioned 
a lack of health and agricultural services, clean markets and streets and operational water points. 
The score for the Rumbek Central County in the criteria effectiveness was 49/100 (DANIDA 
SIDA, 2013: 7). The slightly better score was explained by the existence of policies and county 
strategic plans, financial management systems, and a fair amount of capacity amongst local 
government staff and officials. However, there was a lack of checks and balances in terms of 
monitoring county budgeting, spending, and service delivery. 
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4. Creation of new states  
Driving factors 
At independence in 2011 South Sudan retained the 10 states that were in place under the CPA 
in Southern Sudan. But there were pressures for the creation of new states, and particularly new 
counties. ‘Counties are viewed as highly valuable – both for promoting individual political careers 
and for the communities who see them as a mechanism to access resources…Given the high 
degree of ethnic fragmentation in South Sudan…counties are potentially very important for 
ensuring representation of many groups’ (World Bank, 2015b: 47).  
The LGA does have provision for the creation of new local governments (as well as for changing 
their names, capitals and boundaries), but lays down criteria for this, e.g. region’s population, 
effectiveness, economic viability, common interest of its communities and number of lower-tier 
administrative units the region contains (World Bank, 2015b: 45). Given the appeal of having 
one’s own local government, ‘in practice, there have been increasing demands from specific 
ethnic groups and subgroups ….Having one’s own county, payam, boma or even county capital 
has become synonymous with controlling fiscal or natural resources, as well as signalling political 
inclusion’ (World Bank, 2015b: 45).  
In October 2015 President Salva Kiir announced a plan to replace the existing 10 states with 28 
new ones (Stimson, 2016). After failing to secure the required votes in the lower house of 
parliament for a constitutional amendment to create 28 states2, Kiir went ahead with 
implementation of the plan on 24 December 2015 (Stimson, 2016). At the same time he 
announced that he had appointed state governors for the 28 states: all loyal to him, they were 
sworn in five days later (Sperber, 2016).  
According to Sperber (2016), ‘The subdivision of South Sudan’s states was a blatant power play 
by Kiir, whose newly designed borders ensure powerful majorities for his Dinka tribe in strategic 
locations’. Moreover, it ‘puts the coherence of the rebel movement under strain. Contrary to how 
it is often portrayed internationally, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition 
(SPLA-IO) is a disparate force with an array of localised agendas, some competing against one 
another. Subdividing the country’s state-level boundaries will exacerbate these tensions by 
raising the stakes of local power disputes’ (Sperber, 2016). These explanations are echoed by an 
analysis by the Stimson Centre (2016). They actually identify three main explanations for Kiir’s 
creation of 28 new states (Stimson, 2016: 2): 
 First, he may have wanted to secure a balance of power that favoured his supporters 
and/or members of the Dinka ethnic group.  
 Second, he may have wanted to reinforce his patronage network by creating new 
positions of power that he could award to key figures in order to buy or maintain their 
loyalty.  
 Third, he may have felt pressure to respond to long-standing demands for federalism 
and greater decentralisation of power. The SPLM-IO’s original proposal of 21 states may 
                                                   
2 ‘Constitutional amendments require approval by two-thirds majorities in both houses of 
Parliament, and the bill failed to secure the required votes in the lower house. Nevertheless, Kiir’s 
supporters combined the 189 lower house votes with 39 upper house votes and claimed that the 
bill had passed.’ (Stimson, 2016: 2). 
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have increased the opposition’s legitimacy among constituencies interested in 
federalism, and Kiir’s counter-proposal of 28 states may have been intended to 
undermine that support. 
In January 2017, President Kiir issued a presidential decree further increasing the number of 
states from 28 to 32.3 No reasons were cited for the decision.4 
Impact of the creation of new states 
Conflict  
Whatever the precise explanation for the creation of 28/32 states, there is consensus in the 
literature on its potential impact. Sperber cites several analysts to back her claim that the move 
will fuel conflict in South Sudan. Joshua Craze, a researcher on South Sudan at Small Arms 
Survey, says, ‘Kiir’s order to create 28 states will aggravate already existing fractures within 
South Sudan, and threatens to intensify a whole series of local competitions over land and 
institutions throughout the country’ (Sperber, 2016). This is echoed by the Stimson Centre (2016: 
5): ‘There are abundant and diverse local conflicts across South Sudan that have been altered, 
and in many cases worsened, by the introduction of the 28 states system.’ Schomerus and Aalen 
(2016: 13) note that the division into 28 states will reconfigure local conflicts: ‘There will be new 
majorities and new minorities within the new states and differences between them may be 
sharpened’. 
One immediate effect of the 24 December 2015 announcement was to scupper a peace 
agreement that would have set up a power-sharing unity cabinet, with ministries divided between 
the President’s party (16 ministries) and that of opposition leader Riek Machar (10 ministries) – 
Machar ordered his negotiation team back from Juba and said he wouldn’t return until the 28 
states scheme was rescinded (Sperber, 2016).  
In some areas, however, the creation of new states has been welcomed. This has implications 
for any attempts to return to 10 states: ‘the 28 states system purports to respond to a popular 
demand for greater decentralisation and so has been received positively in some quarters. If the 
system were to be reversed or altered, it would require considerable care…..any attempt to 
change the 28 states could cause challenges by politicians appointed under the new system and 
revolts by communities that favour decentralisation, leading to an “even worse crisis”‘ (Stimson, 
2016: 4). 
Costs 
The World Bank (2015b: 47) warned long before December 2015 that ‘the creation of new states 
or counties could involve trade-offs in terms of service delivery quality, accountability and 
legitimacy, and overall cost’. With regard to cost, the Bank warned that new states would 
significantly increase costs of public administration through, for example, ‘start-up’ costs, new 
administrative buildings, salaries associated with a county’s core administrative functions as well 
as salaries of the county council, commissioner and chief executive officer. It calculated that the 
salary costs associated with a county’s core administrative functions were between USD 114,000 
                                                   
3 https://paanluelwel.com/2017/01/22/the-32-federal-states-of-the-republic-of-south-sudan/  
4 http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article61403  
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and USD 161,000 a year; it used these figures to estimate that the annual cost of setting up six 
new counties in Jonglei would be USD 683,000 (World Bank, 2015b: 47).  
The Stimson Centre’s analysis – carried out once the 28 states had been created - questions 
whether the government would ‘be able to fund an expanded bureaucracy when it was already 
unable to support 10 state administrations’ (2016: 4). It is relevant to note here that South 
Sudan’s oil revenues have decreased in recent years and the country’s debt burden has 
increased (World Bank, 2015b). There are general concerns that ‘if the state cannot afford the 
increased costs associated with the 28 states system, state administrators could extort the 
population to generate revenue’ (Stimson, 2016: 5).   
Service delivery 
With regard to impact on service delivery the World Bank cited comparative analysis of the 
territorial organisation of states which found that ‘initially, moderately increasing the number of 
primary administrative units has a positive effect on service delivery – however, as the number of 
districts increases, the analysis sees a reduction in the quality of services (Grossman & 
Pierskalla, 2014, in World Bank, 2015b: 47). 
Schomerus and Aalen’s analysis of how violent conflict links to the expansion of administrative 
structures in South Sudan draws the following conclusions: ‘It is clear that the establishment of 
structures does not guarantee their function…the establishment of a state government over 
smaller territory does not necessarily mean that it is more accessible to citizens if there are no 
local structures to hold state governments to account’ (Schomerus & Aalen, 2016: 13). Given the 
significant capacity and resource constraints already facing local governments, and their limited 
effectiveness, creation of new states looks set to exacerbate these issues. 
5. Traditional authorities  
Role of traditional authorities 
Diversity 
The literature stresses the diversity of traditional structures in South Sudan. These ‘range from 
the institutions of chiefs, conflict resolution mechanisms, customary law, practices and beliefs’ 
(Mbugua, 2012: 17). ‘Traditional authority vested in native administration consists of diverse 
hierarchies of tribal chiefs and their assistants, elders and opinion leaders in communities’ 
(Wassera, 2007: 6). Santschi (2014) describes the different chiefly institutions in South Sudan 
(varying from area to area) as well as the dissimilar rules followed in different areas for 
succession of chiefs: in some areas chiefs are elected while in others they are selected from 
chiefly families. 
Functions 
In terms of role, ‘Chiefs engage in a number of different activities at the local level in South 
Sudan. They settle disputes in chiefs’ courts, they engage in peace processes, collect taxes, 
allocate food aid, act as intermediaries between the government and the community and they 
mobilise community members for projects’ (Santschi, 2014: 46). However, their main role, both 
12 
historically and in South Sudan today, is probably conflict resolution. Customary law5 is 
considered to be the predominant source of law in South Sudan – almost 90% of everyday 
criminal and civil cases are dealt with and executed under customary law and by traditional 
chiefs and leaders (UNDP, nd: 21). Chiefs and other forms of traditional authorities engage in 
different arenas of local justice and play an active role in various conflict resolution mechanisms 
in South Sudan; these arenas of justice range from informal gatherings to formal hearings in 
chief courts (Santschi, 2014). ‘Traditional leaders and particularly chiefs continue to be the main 
actors in the mitigation and resolution of local conflicts, partly because of the limited capacity of 
the Ministry of Justice to reach the whole country’ (Schomerus & Aalen, 2016: 14). 
Link between communities and local government 
The literature highlights the special position of chiefs straddling communities and local 
governments. On the one hand they have roots in pre-colonial socio-political and spiritual 
institutions, practices and norms, and they are (s)elected as well as potentially dismissed by 
community members - which means that they are accountable to their communities. On the other 
hand, as noted above, the strong colonial roots of administrative chieftaincies mean they have 
always been closely linked with local government institutions. Under the LGA chiefs are given a 
semiautonomous status and are mandated to engage in a number of activities including the 
provision of customary law and justice in the customary law courts (Santschi, 2014: 45). 
Schomerus and Aalen (2016) note that both the LGA and the Land Act mandate chiefs to be the 
primary focal points for conflict mitigation, particularly conflicts associated with land. ‘Accordingly, 
chiefs are associated both with the sphere of the state as well as with the sphere of society’ 
(Santschi, 2014: 45). ‘They exercise influence on local communities and act as intermediaries 
between communities and local governments’ (Wassera, 2007: 6).  
Challenges for traditional authorities  
Effects of war: chiefly authority undermined  
The long-standing position and role of traditional authorities in local governance in South Sudan 
has been undermined by a number of factors related to the country’s long north-south civil war 
(1983-2005). The war resulted in large-scale displacement with fragmented communities, some 
becoming IDPs and some refugees. ‘This reduced the contact between chiefs and followers, and 
led to the waning of chiefly influence and popularity’ (Hoehne, 2008: 17). In their areas of 
displacement, these communities set up their own traditional forms of governance, with chiefs 
and their assistants in IDP camps inside Sudan and refugee camps in exile (Wassera, 2007: 6). 
Often these were new chiefs (Hoehne, 2008: 17). The return process since 2005 has led to 
tension between IDP/refugee chiefs and those who held these positions prior to the second civil 
war.  
During the second civil war chiefs and other traditional leaders also lost influence over their 
communities because of the establishment of parallel leadership structures with the support of 
                                                   
5 ‘Customary law is the manifestation of the customs, beliefs and practices of the people. It is broadly accepted 
that customary law refers to the body of traditions, morals, social conventions and rules that through long usage 
and widespread acceptance, directly govern traditional societies.’ Training Manual for Traditional Authorities on 
Customary Law in South Sudan, (UNDP: nd), p. 21. 
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parties to the war. The government as well as the guerrillas installed new chiefs in the respective 
territories controlled by them (Hoehne, 2008: 17). In the Upper Nile region, for example, the 
emergence of armed groups such as Jeish Mabor (White Army), led to traditional leaders being 
substituted by military commanders (Wassera, 2007: 10).  
The proliferation of new chiefs and their courts was a further factor which undermined chiefly 
authority. ‘The ease with which chiefs were appointed and dismissed by soldiers or guerrillas 
made a mockery of their office’ (Hoehne, 2008: 17). One study describes a proliferation of 
authorities setting up their own courts during the war years: ‘from individual military officers and 
military police to regular police, government officials, and committees of traders. By 2004, in the 
town of Rumbek, for example, it seemed that some kind of court was in process under almost 
every sizeable tree’ (Feiden et al, 2010: 19-20).    
Traditional chiefs who kept their positions were forced to ensure the execution of orders from the 
side of the war they belonged to. They were particularly used by external forces for tax collection: 
chiefs collected taxes in kind (e.g. sorghum) and mobilised human resources, but failure to 
collect taxes or provide young men as recruits could lead to severe punishment (Hoehne, 2008). 
‘Chiefs were also punished for “crimes” committed by their subjects. Frequently the punishment 
had the aim of humiliating the chiefs in front of their communities. Punishment, sometimes on 
order of a foot soldier, reduced a traditional leader to the status of a commoner’ (Hoehne, 2008: 
17). Mbugua (2012: 19) echoes this, noting that the authority of chiefs ‘was undermined by the 
long war whereby emphasis was put on the SPLA military law and tribunal….the AK47 and green 
jungle jacket replaced the fly whisk and the walking stick as symbols of authority’.  
Finally, the destruction of local subsistence economies during the second civil war, and the 
increase in criminality and insecurity, undermined chiefly authority (Hoehne, 2008). 
The literature does not talk about the impact of the current civil war (2013-ongoing) on local 
governance in South Sudan. 
Clash between traditional and modern values 
There are contradictions between traditional and modern governance: ‘A main bone of contention 
regarding traditional governance mechanisms at the local level is their degree of compatibility 
with the laws and principles of the modern state, derived from the constitution’ (Mbugua, 2012: 
17). ‘The majority of South Sudanese customary law systems show plainly a conflict between 
international human rights laws and rights granted to women and children in customary law’ 
(UNDP, nd: 22). Those exposed to ‘new’ ideas during the war in camps/exile claim that strict 
observance of traditional authority is incompatible with social rights, notably of women as 
enshrined in the CPA and the ICSS (and later the Transitional Constitution). The contradictions 
lead to conflict and disruption of social order at the community level (Wassera, 2007: 6). 
Wassera (2007: 11) also points to other ‘competitors’ in the field of conflict resolution: the local 
government, NGOs and civil society organisation including faith-based groups such as the New 
Sudan Council of Churches, which combine traditional and modern values.  
Lack of definition and clarity about roles 
Under the Transitional Constitution and the LGA, the precise position and role of chiefs is not 
defined, potentially leading to conflict. The LGA refers to differing levels of chiefs such as 
paramount chiefs, head chiefs, executive chiefs, sub-chiefs and headmen (Santschi, 2014: 45). 
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‘What has not yet been clarified, however, is the exact level of authority granted to different types 
of chief’ (Schomerus and Aalen, 2016: 14). There are also disagreements about authority over 
land administration between chiefs appointed during the war by the SPLM/A, and those who 
claim legitimacy on the basis that their forebears were appointed by the colonial authority prior to 
independence (Schomerus & Aalen, 2016: 14). 
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